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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Albert Ray Moore appeals from his conviction for felony DUI, challenging 
the denial of his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinas 
Police cited Moore for misdemeanor DUI and driving without privileges on 
September 3, 2006. (R., p. 10.) At Moore's September 5, 2006 arraignment the 
magistrate court set trial for February 21, 2007. (R., pp. 3, 11 .) At the January 
23, 2007 pre-trial conference Moore waived his right to a jury trial, and the court 
subsequently scheduled a court trial for May 14,2007. (R., pp. 4, 24.) 
On March 1, 2007, the state filed an amended complaint alleging a DUI, 
second offense within ten years and a driving without privileges, second offense. 
(R., pp. 26-28.) On the May 14, 2007 trial date the court re-set the trial date to 
July 23, 2007. (R., pp. 4, 29.) On July 23, 2007, the court ordered an evaluation 
and scheduled the matter for a plea and sentencing hearing on September 12, 
2007. (R., p. 30.) On September 12, 2007, however, Moore requested that the 
matter be set for a jury trial. (R., p. 31.) On the pre-trial date, November 19, 
2007, the matter was set for a new pre-trial and trial, on January 22 and February 
15, 2008, respectively. (R., p. 32.) 
On January 4, 2008, the state filed an amended complaint charging felony 
DUI and driving without privileges, second offense. (R., pp. 34-35.) Shortly 
thereafter, Moore filed a motion to dismiss claiming a violation of his statutory 
speedy trial rights. (R., pp. 36-39.) 
Moore was bound over on the felony (R., pp. 50-52, 54-55) and the state 
filed its information on the same charges as in the second amended complaint on 
March 24, 2008 (R., pp. 56-57). The district court denied the motion to dismiss 
on July 11, 2008. (R., pp. 107-13.) Moore thereafter, on December 1, 2008, 
entered a guilty plea to felony DUI, preserving certain issues for appeal. (R., pp. 
135-43; Tr., p. 77, L. 21 - p. 78, L. 7.) The district court entered judgment, 
sentencing Moore to six years with one year determinate. (R., pp. 144-45.) 
Moore filed a timely appeal from the judgment. (R., pp. 147-50.) 
ISSUES 
Moore states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was Mr. Moore denied his federal and state constitutional 
rights to speedy trial by the 18 month delay without good cause 
between his arrest and the time he filed a motion to dismiss? 
2. Was Mr. Moore denied his statutory right to speedy trial 
given the unexcused 18 month delay between arrest and the filing 
of his motion for dismissal? 
3. Should this case be remanded based upon the decision in 
S.Ct. No. 35486 as to whether the prior conviction from North 
Dakota can be used in these Idaho DUI prosecutions? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
I Has Moore shown no error in the district court's denial of Moore's motion 
to dismiss based on statutory and constitutional speedy trial grounds? 






The district court ultimately denied Moore's motion to dismiss on speedy 
trial grounds. (R., pp. 107-12.) Moore contends the trial court erred, but 
application of the law to the record in this case shows that the district court 
correctly found Moore had shown no violation of his speedy trial rights. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether there was an infringement of a defendant's right to a speedy trial 
presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Clark, 135 ldaho 255, 257, 
16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000); State v. Avila, 143 ldaho 849, 852, 153 P.3d 1195, 
1198 (Ct. App. 2006). The appellate court defers to the trial court's findings of 
fact that are supported by substantial and competent evidence, but freely reviews 
the trial court's application of the law to the facts found. &, 143 ldaho at 852, 
153 P.3d at 1198, State v. Davis, 141 ldaho 828, 835, 118 P.3d 160, 167 (Ct. 
App. 2005). 
C. The District Court Correctlv Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding 
That Moore Failed To Establish A Violation Of His Constitutional Speedy 
Trial Riqhts 
"Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, 
$ 13 of the ldaho Constitution guarantee to criminal defendants the right to a 
speedy trial." State v. Lopez, 144 ldaho 349, 352, 160 P.3d 1284, 1287 (Ct. App. 
2007). When analyzing claims of speedy trial violations under the state and 
deral constitutions, the ldaho appellate 
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Winao, 407 U.S. 514 
(1972). State v. Younq, 136 ldaho 113, 117, 29 P.3d 949, 953 (2001); m, 
144 ldaho at 352, 160 P.3d at 1288; State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849,853, 153 P.3d 
1195, 1199 (Ct. App. 2006). The factors to be considered are: ( I )  the length of 
the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his or her 
right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice occasioned by the delay. Barker, 
407 U.S. at 530. 
Contrary to Moore's arguments on appeal, balancing of these factors in 
this case supports the district court's determination that Moore failed to establish 
a violation of his constitutional rights to a speedy trial. 
1. The Length Of The Delay, While Sufficient To Triaaer Balancina, 
Does Not Weiah In Moore's Favor 
"The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until 
there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for 
inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance." Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. 
For purposes of the Sixth Amendment, "the period of delay is measured from the 
date there is 'a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints 
imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge."' Lopez, 144 ldaho 
at 352, 160 P.3d at 1287 (internal quotations omitted) (citing United States v. 
Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971); m, 136 ldaho at 117, 29 P.3d at 953.) 
"Similarly, under the ldaho Constitution, the period of delay is measured from the 
date formal charges are filed or the defendant is arrested, whichever occurs first." 
balancing test is triggered, the length of delay also becomes a factor in and of 
itself. m, 143 ldaho at 853, 153 P.3d at 1199. 
Moore was arrested on September 3, 2006, and he brought his motion to 
dismiss on January 10, 2008. (R., pp. 10, 36.) After extensive briefing and 
argument the district court denied the motion on July 11, 2008. (R., p. 107.) 
Although the delay of 16 months between the arrest and the filing of the motion 
to dismiss is sufficient to trigger the Barker balancing test, it is not excessive. 
See State v. Campbell, 104 ldaho 705, 708, 662 P.2d 1149, I152 (Ct. App. -
1983) (citing State v. Talmacle, 104 ldaho 249, 252, 658 P.2d 920, 923 (1983)) 
("A delay of [approximately 12 months] is sufficient to trigger an inquiry into 
whether speedy trial has been denied."). 
2. Moore Failed To Show That The Reasons For The Delav Were Not 
Justifiable Or Were Caused BV The State 
Implicit in the standards applicable to claims of constitutional speedy trial 
violations is the recognition that "pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly 
justifiable." m, 143 ldaho at 853, 153 P.3d at 1199 (citing Dogqett v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 647, 656 (1992)); State v. Davis, 141 ldaho 828, 837, 118 P.3d 
160, 169 (Ct. App. 2005) (same). For that reason, different weights are assigned 
to different reasons for the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. As explained by the 
Supreme Court: 
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the 
defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A 
more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts 
should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be 
onsibility for such circumstances 
han with the defendant. 
Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to 
justify appropriate delay. 
Id. at 531 (footnote omitted). -
Moore has failed to show that the delay was not the result of his own 
actions, much less that it was the state that caused the delay. The trial was 
initially set for February 21, 2007, less than six months after Moore's arrest, with 
a pre-trial scheduled for January 23, 2007. (R., p. 3.) At the pre-trial Moore 
waived his right to a jury trial and the trial was set over to May 14, 2007. (R., pp. 
4, 24.) Nothing in the record states why the trial was reset from February until 
In March the state amended the complaint to add an allegation of a prior 
conviction, elevating the DUI to a second offense misdemeanor. (R., pp. 25-28.) 
On May 8, 2007, the trial court apparently reset the trial date again to July 23, 
2007. (R., pp. 4, 29.) Again, no reason for this reset of dates was provided by 
Moore in support of his motion. On July 23, 2007, it appears that the parties had 
reached a plea agreement (or at least felt that they would) because the case was 
reset for entry of plea and sentencing on September 12, 2007. (R., p. 30.) On 
' At the bottom of the minutes there is a note: "Per Marjorie [the court clerk] set 
on officer schedule." (R., p. 24.) This note apparently relates to the rescheduling 
of the trial, not the reason why the trial was set over. If the trial was set over due 
to officer unavailability, however, such was a legitimate reason. Barker, 407 U.S. 
at 531. 
September 12, 2007, however, there was no guilty plea and no sentencing. 
to December 14, 2007, with a pre-trial conference for November 19, 2007. (R., 
On November 19, 2007, the matter was unsettled and a request to reset 
the trial date was granted, although the record does not indicate who asked that 
the trial be rescheduled. (R., pp. 4, 32.) The new pre-trial and trial dates were, 
respectively, January 22, 2008 and February 15, 2008. (R., pp. 4, 32.) 
On January 4, 2008, the state moved to amend to allege a felony DUI. 
(R., pp. 33-35.) Six days later Moore filed his motion to dismiss. 
This record shows that Moore simply failed to present any evidence or 
otherwise establish on the record that the delay was not his doing or was not 
done without his acquiescence. There is no evidence that the state caused any 
of the delay at hand. In fact, the appellate record is devoid of any showing of the 
reasons for the delay. 
In addition, the district court cited to "pretrial memoranda" that are not in 
the appellate record,' which indicated that Moore at least acquiesced in setting 
over the initial January 2007 trial date because of a possible resolution (Tr., p. 4, 
L. 18 - p. 5, L. 2); stipulated or acquiesced in setting over the July 23, 2007 trial 
date for a sentencing in September of that year because of a possible settlement 
Of course matters not in the appellate record are assumed to support the district 
court's holding. State v. Sima, 98 ldaho 643, 644, 570 P.2d 1333, 1334 (1977); 
State v. McConnell, 125 ldaho 907, 909, 876 P.2d 605, 607 (Ct. App. 1994); 
State v. Reoici, 122 ldaho 538, 541, 835 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Ct. App. 1992). 
(Tr., p. 6, L. 19 - p. 7, L. 18); requested to reset the trial scheduled for December 
to appear in court for his arraignment or preliminary hearing in January, 2008 
(Tr., p. 10, L. 7 - p. 11, L. 14); and requested or acquiesced in setting over the 
preliminary hearing scheduled for March 6, 2008 (Tr., p. 11, L. 22 - p. 12, L. 5). 
Moore contends that some of the delay was due to the state's failure to 
find his prior convictions and charge him with a felony. There is no basis in the 
record for such, however. The first amendment to the complaint, to allege an 
enhanced misdemeanor, was filed in March, 2007, with a pending trial date of 
May 14, 2007. The record does not indicate why the court on May 8 reset the 
trial date to the next July. Moore is only speculating that it had something to do 
with the amendment. 
Likewise, the state filed the felony complaint on January 4, 2008. No 
doubt this caused some delay as it necessitated the holding or waiving of a 
preliminary hearing, but Moore moved for dismissal almost immediately after this 
amendment. There is nothing in the record to suggest that this delay was or 
would have been significant. 
Moore argues that delay cannot be attributed to him on this record. As 
noted, however, the record Moore provided is deficient. The matters cited by the 
trial judge indeed show that Moore at least acquiesced in the delays. Thus, 
Moore has failed to show that this factor weighs in favor of dismissal and against 
the district court's actions. 
3. Moore Did Not Timely Assert His Constitutional Speedy Trial Riahts 
asserted his constitutional right to a speedy trial. A defendant's assertion of his 
right is "entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the 
defendant is being deprived of the right." Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32; State v. 
Davis, 141 ldaho 828, 839-40, 118 P.3d 160, 171-72 (Ct. App. 2005). "Failure to 
assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he or she was 
denied a speedy trial." Davis, 141 ldaho at 839, 118 P.3d at 171. 
Moore first asserted his sfafutory right to a speedy trial in his motion to 
dismiss filed on January 10, 2008, six days after the state amended to allege a 
felony and 16 months after his arrest. The timing of Moore's assertion of his 
rights shows he was not truly concerned about delay and did not believe it was 
prejudicing his case. State v. Lopez, 144 ldaho 349, 353, 160 P.3d 1284, 1288 
(Ct. App. 2007) (failure to assert right "is closely related to and affects other 
Barker factors, including prejudice and reasons for the delay"). The timing of 
Moore's motion after prior acquiescence in delay shows he was seeking to take 
advantage of delay rather than being truly interested in going to trial. Davis, 141 
ldaho at 839, 1'18 P.3d at 171. This factor weighs heavily against a finding of a 
speedy trial violation. 
4. Moore Failed To Establish That He Was Unfairly Preiudiced By The 
Delay 
The final and most important factor in the m r  analysis is the nature 
and extent of any prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the delay. 
Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; u, 144 ldaho at 354, 160 P.3d at 1289; Davis, 141 
Prejudice is to be assessed in light of the interests of defendants 
which the right to a speedy trial is designed to protect. Those 
interests are (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to 
minimize anxiety and concern of the accused, and (3) to limit the 
possibility that the defense will be impaired. 
Youn(l, 136 ldaho at 118, 29 P.3d at 954 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). Accord 
m, 144 ldaho at 354-55, 160 P.3d at 1289-90; &, 143 ldaho at 854, 153 
P.3d at 1200; m, 141 ldaho at 840, 118 P.3d at 172. "The third of these is 
the most significant because a hindrance to adequate preparation of the defense 
'skews the fairness of the entire system."' Lopez, 144 ldaho at 355, 160 P.3d at 
1290 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; State v. Hernandez, 133 ldaho 576, 583, 
990 P.2d 742,749 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
The district court's recitation of the record before it3 shows that Moore was 
incarcerated after his September 3, 2006 arrest (Tr., p. 2, L. 23 - p. 3, L. I I )  and 
was released after posting bond on November 24, 2006 (Tr., p. 5, Ls. 3-5). He 
was also in custody later when arrested on a warrant issued when he failed to 
appear for scheduled court proceedings. (Tr., p. 10, L. 7 - p. 11, L. 14.) The 
state submits that his incarceration for less than three months at the start of 
proceedings does not weigh heavily in Moore's favor, and time spent 
incarcerated due to his failure to appear should not weigh in his favor at all. 
AS noted above, supra, n. 2, the record before the district court was apparently 
more extensive than the appellate record provided by Moore, and Moore's failure 
to provide a complete record is grounds for rejecting his claims on appeal. 
11 
Moore undoubtedly felt some anxiety and concern. Such was inevitable 
at his anxiety and 
concern did not rise to the level where he objected to the delay in bringing him to 
trial until after he was charged with a felony. 
Finally, Moore simply presented no evidence to support a claim that his 
defense was actually impaired by the delay. Moore acknowledges as much, 
arguing on appeal only that the anxiety and uncertainty he felt is enough to show 
prejudice. (Appellant's brief, p. 11.) If such were sufficient to show prejudice, 
however, prejudice would exist in every case. This factor also weighs against 
finding a violation of the right to speedy trial. 
5. A Balancinq Of The Barker Factors Weiahs Aqainst A Finding Of A 
S~eedv Trial Violation 
The four Barker factors, together with any other relevant circumstances, 
must be balanced and weighed to determine whether an individual's right to a 
speedy trial was violated. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. In this case, although the 
length of the delay was sufficient to trigger a constitutional analysis, the factors, 
on balance, weigh against a finding of a speedy trial violation. The delay was 
relatively short; Moore failed to establish that the reasons for delay should weigh 
in his favor; he failed to timely assert his constitutional speedy trial rights; and he 
failed to demonstrate that he was unfairly prejudiced by the delay. Moore has 
therefore failed to show error in the denial of his motion to dismiss on speedy trial 
grounds. 
D. Moore Has Shown No Error In The District Court's Determination That 
Moore Failed To Demonstrate A Statutory S~eedv Trial Violation 
01 supplements the speedy trial provisions of the 
United States and ldaho Constitutions and sets forth specific time limits within 
which a criminal defendant must be brought to trial. State v. Clark, 135 ldaho 
255, 257, 16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000). Specifically, the portion of the statute 
relevant to this case. provides: 
The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must 
order the prosecution or indictment to be dismissed, in the following 
cases: 
(1) When a person has been held to answer for a public 
offense, if an indictment or information has not been found against 
him and filed with the court within six (6) months from the date of 
his arrest. 
I.C. § 19-3501(1)? For purposes of this statute, "good cause means that there is 
a substantial reason that rises to the level of a legal excuse for the delay." Clark, 
135 ldaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936 (citing State v. Johnson, 119 ldaho 56, 58, 803 
P.2d 557, 559 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Stuart, 113 ldaho 494, 496, 745 P.2d 
1115, 1117 (Ct. App. 1987)); accord State v. Young, 136 ldaho 113, 116,29 P.3d 
Moore has not asserted which subsection of I.C. § 19-3501 he contends applies 
in this case. (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-18.) Because this case involves a felony 
(a fact admitted by Moore through his guilty plea), and because Moore never 
asserted his statutory right until the state had charged the felony through its 
second amended complaint, the state contends that the misdemeanor sections of 
I.C. § 19-3501 do not apply and, further, that the provisions about trial within six 
months after the filing of the information or arraignment, I.C. § 19-3501(2) & (3) 
do not apply factually. Thus, subsection (1) is the only subsection that even 
arguably applies to this case. 
In this case Moore was arrested on September 3, 2006, and the 
information was not filed until March 24, 2008. Thus, more than six months had 
passed between his arrest and the filing of the information. As found by the 
district court, however, the record establishes good cause for the delay. (R., pp. 
107-12;Tr.,p. l ,L .9 -p .13 ,L .4 ;p .26 ,L .7 -p .32 ,L . I6 . )  
There is no fixed rule for determining whether good cause exists to delay 
a trial and, as such, the matter is initially left to the discretion of the trial court. 
m, 136 ldaho at 116, 29 P.3d at 952 (citing Clark, 135 ldaho at 260, 16 P.3d 
at 936). The trial court's discretion is not unbridled, however, and its decision is 
subject to independent review on appeal. Id. Ultimately, "whether legal excuse 
has been shown is a matter for judicial determination upon the facts and 
circumstances of each case." C&k, 135 ldaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936 (citing 
Johnson, 119 ldaho at 58,803 P.2d at 559; m, 113 ldaho at 496,745 P.2d at 
1117). 
Here the delay between the arrest and the filing of the information was 
caused by the state's failure to learn of the underlying convictions supporting the 
felony charge. (R., pp. 110-1 1 (delay caused by "prosecution's delayed research 
into the defendant's history of DUls".) Once the state did know of the prior 
convictions it amended the complaint and sought to file the information. (Id.) 
The fact that the state learned that the DUI in question was a felony more than 
six months after Moore's' arrest, regardless of the reason for when the state so 
learned, is good cause for not filing an information within six months of the arrest. 
11. 
Moore Has Failed To Show That He Is Entitled To Anv Relief In This Case Based 
On An Issue. He Raised In Another Case 
Moore contends that if he prevails on appeal in docket 35486 on the 
question of whether his North Dakota conviction is based on a substantially 
conforming DUI statute he should be entitled to remand "for dismissal or 
withdrawal of the plea." (Appellant's brief, p. 15.~) The state concedes, for 
purposes of appellate argument, that if he prevails on the stated issue he is 
entitled to further proceedings in the lower court.' His argument ultimately fails, 
however, because the North Dakota conviction is a proper enhancer for the 
reasons stated in the briefing in that case. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of 
conviction. 
DATED this 20th day of Octo 
T h e  state further notes that Moore has raised an issue related to evidentiary 
rulings at trial in Docket no. 35486. Nothing in the record indicates that those 
issues are relevant to this appeal or that his guilty plea was conditioned in any 
way on the correctness of those rulings. 
'The state does not concede that Moore would be entitled to the remedy of either 
dismissal or withdrawal of his guilty plea. The record does not indicate what 
remedy he might be entitled to under the plea agreement. (Tr., p. 77, L. 21 - p. 
78, L. 7.) Indeed, the state submits that a more appropriate and likely remedy 
would be that Moore's conviction be reduced to a second-offense misdemeanor 
DUI. The proper place to determine what the parties intended as a remedy 
under the plea agreement, however, is the district court. 
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